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Purposes and Tools of the Market for Corporate Control
by
Alessandro Benocci*
The theme of the market for corporate control features among the most important issues of
corporate governance and financial markets. This forces to reflect on the effects produced by
regulations on control changes. In this regard, this paper aims to contribute to the establish-
ment of certain methodological rules in order to develop an analytical model that can serve as
a tool for an ex-ante evaluation of a regulation of the market for corporate control and may
illustrate the impact of a given takeover regulation on the policy purposes it aims to achieve.
To this end, the paper intends to identify (i) the traditional policy purposes of a takeover
regulation, (ii) the traditional regulatory tools that are available for market regulators, (iii)
the impact of each regulatory tool on each policy purpose, (iv) the impact of a given combi-
nation of regulatory tools on the overall policy purposes and, ultimately, (v) the ex-ante rating
that can be given to a specific takeover regulation.
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I. Introduction
This paper aims to contribute to the development of a theoretical model that
can serve as a tool for an ex-ante evaluation of a regulation of the market for
corporate control and therefore for an impact assessment of a possible regu-
latory structure on certain desirable goals of legal policy. Especially in the field
of transfer of corporate control, it is essential not so much to knowwhat a rule
states, but why that rule states something. Furthermore, it is essential to con-
sider not only current regulations, but also to look back in order to understand
what may happen tomorrow both in terms of best involvement in any policy
debates and in terms of understanding of the possible changes in the law. I will
structure my considerations with this in mind and I will focus more on the
economic analysis of law than on the hermeneutics, and more on the policy of
law than on a review of current legislation.
A regulation of the market for corporate control is simultaneously a tool both
of corporate governance and of financial markets. As a tool of corporate
governance, any takeover regulation directly affects the level of mobility of
the ownership structure of companies operating in a given system and, con-
sequently, affects the degree of stability and the possibility of alternation in the
ownership and management of any company.1 The levels of stability or mobi-
lity and monitoring dynamics also affect the likelihood of removing incom-
petent or unfair entrepreneurs and, therefore, the opportunity for new busi-
ness skills to emerge. In this way, they contribute to achieving the typical goals
of corporate governance, which involve curbing the opportunism of managers
and controlling shareholders, on the one hand, and enhancing the efficiency of
corporate management, on the other.2 As an instrument of financial markets,
1 See AABerle andGCMeans,TheModern Corporation and Private Property (NewYork
1932), 3; R Romano, ‘A Guide to Take-Overs: Theory, Evidence and Regulation’, in KJ
Hopt and E Wymeersch (eds), European Takeovers:Law and Practice (Oxford 1992), 3;
PG Jaeger, ‘Gli azionisti: spunti per una discussione’ [1993] Giurisprudenza commerciale
23, 28.
2 In support of the brief summary outlined in the text, we may observe the following.
Firstly, the presence of limited mobility of control prevents the emergence of new man-
agement skills and hence hinders the achievement of the objectives of corporate gover-
nance. Consequently, higher mobility of the ownership structure and the creation of a
proper market for corporate control can be regarded as highly efficient instruments for
furthering the goals of corporate governance. Secondly, low mobility of control is not in
itself a sign of inefficiency. In fact, as regards efficient allocation of resources, mobility of
control increases efficiency only if it favours the rise of suitable management. Further-
more, considerable mobility of control that penalizes incumbent managers regardless of
their abilitymay be a serious disincentive to perform their duties appropriately.However,
since the acquisition of managerial skills is undoubtedly favoured by exercising business
activities, a high mobility of control and the possibility of a change in management are
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takeover regulation also indirectly affects the final objectives that, as such,
financial markets have the task to fulfil. If it is indeed likely that an adequate
takeover regulation contributes to enabling efficient allocation of corporate
control and governance, then it will be equally true that, ultimately, such
regulationwill also help to ensure an efficient allocation of economic resources
and of savings in general.3
Given this, a regulation of the market for corporate control regulates both the
particular commodity traded on that market (i.e. the corporate control) and
the possible techniques for the transfer of that commodity. As regards the first
point, the relevant concept of corporate control is that contextualized within
the horizon of the ownership structure of a company and its mobility. There-
fore, it manifests itself as “control by shareholding”, which consequently
permits us to identify the concept of corporate control with the “shareholding
of an amount such as to allow the owner to exercise (de jure or de facto, alone
or jointly, directly or indirectly) a dominant influence on the shareholders’
meetings of the company”.4 On the second point, transfer of corporate control
can be achieved through a variety of circulatory techniques. Among them,
also non-consensual conditions necessary not only to remove managers that are inept or
culpable but also to bring out hidden entrepreneurial skills. SeeHGManne, ‘Mergers and
the Market for Corporate Control’ [1965] Journal of Political Economy 73, 115; MC
Jensen, ‘AgencyCosts of Free cash-flow, Corporate finance and Takeovers’ [1986] Amer-
ican Economic Review 659, 670.
3 See L Enriques, Mercato del controllo societario e tutela degli investitori. La disciplina
dell’opa obbligatoria (Bologna 2002), 11.
4 The notion of “corporate control” briefly proposed here is for the purposes of this
research only and is based on the many contributions that have questioned the existence
or otherwise of a unitary notion of corporate control. On this basis, control can be
considered as a relationship between an “active subject” and a “passive subject”, whereby
the former can make their decisions affect the fate of the latter through certain “means”
(dominant or decisive influence). However, this research paper deals with the issue of the
corporate ownership and of the mobility of this ownership. Given that, the concept of
“control” tout court is not as relevant for the purposes considered here, as the narrower
“control by shareholding”. This choice affects the definition as internal (not external or
by agreement), de jure or de facto, alone or joint, direct or indirect control. No con-
straints should be applied to the definition of the “active subject” of control, which
therefore may be another company, or another collective organization or even individ-
uals. On the other hand, the definition of the “passive subject” must be narrowed down,
as in the context of this research it only comprises companies. For the purposes consid-
ered here, the term “corporate control” has to be understood as an amount of shares
sufficient to guarantee that whoever holds them can also exercise, de jure or de facto,
alone or jointly, directly or indirectly, the dominant influence at shareholders’ meetings.
See PDavies andKJHopt, ‘Control Transactions’, in RRKraakman and others (eds),The
Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford 2004),
157;MNotari,La nozione di “controllo” nella legislazione antitrust (Milano 1996), 217; P
Ferro-Luzzi and PGMarchetti, ‘Riflessioni sul gruppo creditizio’ [1994]Giurisprudenza
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there are two that stand out: the “private treaty” and the “public offer to the
target company’s shareholders to acquire the related corporate control” (the
so-called takeover bid). The former is the ordinary process that leads to the
signing of an equally ordinary transfer agreement and that follows the rules
prescribed by Contract Law in general and by the sale-purchase contracts
regulations in particular.5 The latter is a process that is functionally similar,
but structurally different. In fact, the takeover bid starts with a binding offer
relating to a certain amount of shares and is addressed by the offeror to all the
shareholders of the target company. The next stage is the adhesion by the
offerees, who accept the offer unconditionally; and the process ends – when
successful – with the transfer of the shares and the payment of the amount
due.6 The combination of all the above elements allows us to understand what
the concept of “market for corporate control” is, i.e. a virtual place for the
transfer of shareholdings that allows the owner to exercise a dominant influ-
ence on the shareholders’ meetings of the company by two principal means, by
private treaty or by a takeover bid.
The fact that the theme of the market for corporate control and the mobility of
the ownership structure features among the most important issues of corpo-
rate governance and financial markets, forces us to reflect on the effects pro-
duced by regulations on changes in control. In this regard, it is necessary to
establish certain methodological rules whereby we may scrutinize such a legal
system (both from a legal policy perspective and from the perspective of
evaluating existing law) in order to develop an analytical model that may
illustrate the impact of a given takeover regulation on the policy purposes it
aims to achieve. To this end, it is necessary to identify (i) the traditional policy
purposes of a takeover regulation, (ii) the traditional regulatory tools that are
available for market regulators, (iii) the impact of each regulatory tool on each
policy purpose, (iv) the impact of a given combination of regulatory tools on
the overall policy purposes and, ultimately, (v) the ex-ante rating that can be
given to a specific takeover regulation.
commerciale 442, 449; M Lamandini, Il “controllo”. Nozioni e “tipo” nella legislazione
economica (Milano 1995), 11.
5 It should be added that private agreement differs depending on whether it concerns a
preformed controlling interest of shares or gradual acquisitions of the shares on the
market, with the goal of gaining a controlling interest of the target company. In this
regard, see M Stella Richter jr., “Trasferimento del controllo” e rapporti tra soci (Milano
1996), 95.
6 See A Dignam and JP Lowry, Company Law (Oxford 2009), 80; LG Picone, Le offerte
pubbliche di acquisto (Milano 1999), 2.
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II. Purposes of a Takeover Regulation
The literature is not unanimous as regards the identification of the traditional
policy purposes of a takeover regulation, but we may identify such purposes,
with a certain approximation, by starting from a situation where transfers of
corporate control are not specifically regulated. The interests that remain un-
protected in such a situation (andwhich are seen as deservingof protection)will
necessarily emerge as policy purposes of any regulation that may be provided.
We could assume an unregulated situation – a realistic hypothesis given that it is
true that, in theUS, there is a federal lawdating back to the 30s, but it is also true
that inEuropewehadtowaitfortheDirective2004/25/ECandthat, inmanyEU
Countries, specific rules have been introduced only with the Directive trans-
position, while the introduction in other EUCountries of a first form of regu-
lationwas – however – fairly recent; inUK, the experience of theCityCode on
TakeoversandMergersdatesbacktothe60s,butanaccomplishedregulationwas
not provided until the Companies Act 2006; in France, a general framework
existed since the 70s, but a special regulationwas introduced just by theLawno.
531/1989; in Italy, by the Law no. 149/1992; in Spain, by the Royal Decree no.
279/1984.7Werewe to do this, the possible scenarios in the event of a transfer of
corporate control are the following: (a) existence of an agreement between
raidersandcontrollingshareholdersof the targetcompany(so-called“friendly”
takeover); (b) absence of an agreement between raiders and controlling share-
holders of the target company, with the target company not being contendible
because its shareholders only have de facto control (so-called “hostile” take-
over); (c) absenceof an agreement between raiders andcontrolling shareholders
of the targetcompanywiththetargetcompanynotbeingcontendiblebecause its
shareholders also have de iure control. The third scenario however, may be
shelved immediately as in this case no problem arises, whatever the choice re-
garding the regulation or non-regulation of the transfer of corporate control
(unless we fantasize about a highly unlikely expropriation hypothesis).Wewill
thus consider the first two scenarios.
In the presence of scenario (a) (agreement between raiders and controlling
shareholders of the target company), the transfer of corporate control takes
place by private treaty. This raises the following issues.8 Firstly, the ownership
of corporate control passes from the seller to the purchaser upon the payment
of a sum that includes not only the market value of the shares acquired, but
also a so-called “majority bonus” that can be configured as a “plus-value”
7 See GK Morse, ‘The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers – Self Regulation or Self
Protection?’ [1991] Journal of Business Law 509, 513; R Skog, ‘Se l’O.P.A. obbligatoria
sia davvero necessaria. Riflessioni critiche alla luce del sistema svedese (Does Sweden
Need a Mandatory Bid Rule? A Critical Analysis)’ [1995] Rivista delle società 967, 988.
8 In this case, the private agreement will concern a preformed controlling interest.
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corresponding to the “plus-power” connected with the holding of corporate
control. In such a situation, the controlling shareholders of the target company
(and they alone) will be free to leave the company and receive the majority
bonus. On the other hand, the minority shareholders of the same company
will not only be unable to leave the company, but will also be barred from
participating in the sharing of the majority bonus and, will hence suffer a clear
disparity of treatment.9 Secondly, if the transfer of corporate control is carried
out by private treaty this may take place in a confidential manner andmay thus
occur without the minority shareholders being informed in any way. The
minority shareholders may therefore perceive their investment as being sub-
ject to adverse effects induced by unforeseen “surprises”, due to the opacity of
the market.10 Thirdly, if it is true that an easy transferability of the controlling
interest may have a positive effect on the possibility of replacing inefficient
ownership and management with efficient ownership and management, the
opposite is also true. In fact, the free market mechanism does not necessarily
lead to an adequate level of selection of management skills: when agreed, the
transfer of control may also be made by a raider who plans to gain private
benefits to offset the financial effort involved and may lead to a “plundering”
of the target company.11 Ultimately, this scenario leads to the strong emer-
gence of the need for both adequate contendibility and equal treatment and
transparency and, therefore, protection of minority shareholders. When this is
lacking, the results in terms of corporate governance (wewould say, themicro-
economic outcomes) will be those described above. However, even at market
level (we would say, at the macroeconomic level), the results may easily be
sub-optimal, because the financial market will reduce the degree of credibility
and investors will be deterred from channelling their savings through the
financial sector circuits, thus preventing the financial market from fulfilling
its duty of increasing the efficiency of the allocation of savings and, ultimately,
of the entire economic system.12
In the presence of scenario (b) (no agreement between raiders and controlling
shareholders of the contendible target company), the transfer of corporate
control can take place either by private treaty or by takeover bid. If the transfer
of corporate control takes place by private treaty in addition to most of the
problems seen above, there will be further problems arising from the fact that,
in this case, the subject of the agreed sale will not simply be a preformed
controlling interest, but will regard several small tranches of shares, belonging
9 See SJ Grossman and O Hart, ‘An Analysis of the Principal-Agent problem’ [1983]
Econometrica 7, 51.
10 See Stella Richter jr., “Trasferimento del controllo” e rapporti tra soci, op cit, 96.
11 See Enriques, Mercato del controllo societario e tutela degli investitori, op cit, 19.
12 See LA Bebchuck and A Ferrell, ‘A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory
Competition’ [2001] Virginia Law Review 87, 111.
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to non-controlling shareholders, that will lead to a share mopping on the stock
market with the consequent risk of speculation.13 If the transfer of corporate
control takes place by an unregulated and voluntary takeover bid, then a
problem arises. In fact, the board of the target company may adopt defense
techniques that, in the absence of procedural rules, could be undertaken with-
out constraint and therefore might harm the regular trading process.14 By
contrast, the takeover bid offers doubtless advantages. On the one hand, it
requires raiders to come out into the open immediately and this has a positive
effect on the perceived need for transparency. On the other hand, it allows
minority shareholders to participate in the full or partial sharing of any ma-
jority bonus paid, and this in turn positively affects the other perceived need
for equal treatment between majority and minority shareholders.15
The analysis of the situation of the so-called “free market for corporate con-
trol” clearly shows two distinct needs that, in policy debates, have been taken
as the principal purposes of a takeover regulation: on the one hand, the aim of
protecting minority shareholders that mainly relates to warranty profiles; on
the other hand, the aim of contendibility for corporate control, which mainly
relates to efficiency profiles. These needs are known to the European regulator
and the Directive 2004/25/EC clearly shows this.
1. Protection of Minority Shareholders
As regards the first purpose (the protection of minority shareholders), this
responds to two different needs. On the one hand, the protection of small
13 See Enriques, Mercato del controllo societario e tutela degli investitori, op cit, 20.
14 See LA Bebchuck, ‘The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers’ [2002] Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review 973, 980; LA Bebchuck and A Ferrell, ‘Federalism and
Corporate Law: the Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers’ [1999] Columbia Law
Review 1168, 1171; P Davies, ‘The Regulation of Defensive Tactics in the United King-
dom and the United States’, in KJ Hopt and E Wymeersch (eds), European Takeover-
s:Law and Practice (Oxford 1992), 195. In Italian literature, see also R Costi, Il mercato
mobiliare (Torino 1999), 82, in which the Author provides examples of defensive strat-
egies, dividing them into three categories. Firstly, among the “acts that aim to increase
the necessary cost to achieve the amount of shares that the bidder intends to acquire,”
we find capital increases and the conversion of shares without voting rights to shares
with voting rights. Secondly, of the “operations aimed at changing the characteristics of
the target company assets” there are the transfer of goods, mergers and spin-offs; among
the “disruptive behaviours” there are the counter bid on the shares of the offeror, “gold-
en parachute” provisions for the current management or, finally, the acquisition of
companies that would make a successful bid incompatible with antitrust legislation.
15 See Bebchuck and Ferrell, ‘A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Com-
petition’, op cit, 113.
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shareholders reduces the cost of capital and increases the supply of equity for
companies. In fact, when small shareholders fear expropriation of their re-
sources for the benefit of controlling shareholders, they will only be willing to
invest their savings in equity if the remuneration takes into account the risk of
expropriation that they face. Consequently; the cost of capital will be high and
the financial structure of companies will be oriented towards the use of alter-
native ways of financing such as bank loans. Hence, market capitalization
crucially depends on the rights and protection provided to small shareholders;
indeed, at the basis of the protection provided to small shareholders there is
also a motive of economic efficiency, i.e. to avoid a distorted corporate finance
structure. On the other hand, and more traditionally, protecting minority
shareholders is required in order to ensure equal treatment among all the
shareholders of the company; this principle does not arise from any economic
reasoning, but rather reflects one of the fundamental principles of law. All this
is clear from the second Recital of the Directive, which states that “it is neces-
sary to protect the interests of holders of the securities of companies, in par-
ticular those with minority holdings, when those companies are the subject of
takeover bids or of changes of control”.
The purpose of the protection of minority shareholders may, however, be
achieved by attempting to implement the following two intermediate goals:
firstly, the purpose of transparency, which can concern both the corporate
governance and its ownership structure; secondly, the purpose of equal treat-
ment between majority shareholders and minority shareholders.
The intermediate goal of transparency – regarding corporate ownership and
governance – aims to allow the market to assess correctly the company’s
results, thus strengthening both the ability of investors (including those wish-
ing to gain corporate control) to make considered investments, while also
strengthening the financial market’s credibility, which is essential to ensure
that savings turn to the brokering channels with confidence. “It is necessary to
create Community-wide clarity and transparency”, reads the third Recital of
theDirective, while Recitals (12) and (13) say that an offeror should inform the
holders of securities of the terms of the bid and the supervisory authority of
the decision to launch a bid as soon as possible “in order to reduce the scope
for insider dealing”.16
The intermediate goal of equal treatment betweenmajority andminority share-
holders can then be broken down further: when transfers of corporate control
are imminent, equal treatment between the two categories of shareholders can
16 See P Davies, ‘The Notion of Equality in European Takeovers Regulation’, in J Payne
(ed), Takeovers in English and German Law (Cambridge 2002), 9; W Andrews, ‘The
Stockholder’s Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares’ [1965] Harvard Law
Review 505, 512.
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actually affect both the amount and the price of the transferable shares. In this
regard,we sawearlier thatwhen there is a “friendly takeover” in anunregulated
market for corporate control, the ownership of the controlling interest passes
from the majority shareholders of the target company to the raider, with the
payment of amajority bonus that is not extended to theminority shareholders.
Acknowledging this economic disparity betweenmajority andminority share-
holders led to the establishment, in terms of public policy, of the principle of
equal treatment regardingthepriceof theshares sold,whichwouldobviouslybe
maximized should minority shareholders participate in the distribution of the
entire control bonus over all the sold shares: in this respect, Recital (9) of the
Directive takescare toestablishthat theMemberStatesshouldensuresuchequal
treatmentbyobliging thepersonwhohasacquiredcontrol’s companysecurities
to make an offer to the holders of that company’s securities “at an equitable
price”. However, we cannot forget that the disparity between majority and
minority shareholders may concern not only the price of the sold shares, but
also the amount of transferable securities. An expression of unequal treatment
can thus be found in the fact that while majority shareholders are free to decide
whether to sell the corporate control, and towhom,minority shareholders have
no say in thematter, although the changes in the ownership structuremay have
important implications on their equity investment too. Therefore, policy de-
bates take into consideration the goal of equal treatment, also as regards the
amount of transferable securities that, in the case of maximisation would give
all shareholders – and not just majority shareholders – the right to sell all their
shares and leave the company (the so-called “exit right”). For minority share-
holders, thisopportunitywouldbeanadditional formofprotection,witheffects
very similar to thoseof awithdrawal, because itwould allowminoritygroups to
sell shares in order to express distrust in the newmanager of their savings and in
fact, Recital (9) of the Directive also states that the person who has acquired
control’s companysecurities shouldbeobligedbytheMemberStates tomakean
offer “to all the holders of that company’s securities for all their holdings”.
2. Contendibility for Corporate Control
The second purpose (the contendibility for corporate control), fully responds
to an economic logic. At least from a theoretical point of view, benefits in
terms of increased allocative efficiency related to the purpose of contendibility
would be of two types: enterprise resources would be entrusted to those
managers best able to use them and management targets would be better
aligned with those of the company’s shareholders.
Through the pursuit of contendibility, investors and the market may supervise
and monitor entrepreneurs continuously to ensure that corporate control is
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allocated and practiced efficiently. In fact, investors and the market must have
direct and indirect supervision tools through which they can identify and
correct abuses or errors in a timely manner, with the option – as a last resort
– of bringing about a non-consensual change in corporate control.17 The pur-
suit of contendibility is also designed to remove the excessive costs and ob-
stacles related to the acquisition of controlling interest. On the one hand,
takeovers allow the replacement of less efficient managers with more efficient
management. On the other hand, the fear of being replaced would have a
disciplinary effect on the current managers, who would be forced to refrain
from inefficient behaviors and, on the positive side, would feel obliged to
provide high returns to their shareholders, in order to induce them not to
withdraw their investment. Indeed, Recital (19) of the Directive states cate-
gorically that Member States should take the necessary measures to afford any
offeror the possibility of acquiring majority interests in other companies and
of fully exercising control of them. Some interpreters then argue that, if the
threat of takeovers has such a positive effect on the corporate management,
then the market for corporate control should not be hindered because it would
not only ensure an efficient allocation of resources in the interest of the entire
social community, but also offer an additional form of protection of minority
shareholders.18 However, after observing many takeovers that took place in
the United States in the ‘80s, other interpreters reached the opposite conclu-
sion, as they found that takeovers may also be motivated by considerations
that have nothing to do with economic efficiency, such as assets division,
managers’ delusions of grandeur, etc.19
3. Relationships and Interactions
The academic literature broadly agrees that the protection of minority share-
holders and the contendibility for corporate control may actually be consid-
ered as the main policy purposes of a takeover regulation and that these two
aims are in clear conflict and in substantial trade-off: in fact, an increased
protection of minority shareholders may decrease the ability of the controlling
shareholders to extract private benefits and – consequently – may decrease the
17 See JC Coffee, ‘Regulating the Market for Corporate Control’ [1984] Columbia Law
Review 1145, 1282.
18 See F Carbonetti, ‘La nuova disciplina delle offerte pubbliche di acquisto’ [1998] Rivista
delle società 1358, 1361, that adds that “the market egalitarianism may certainly justify
imposing the burden of guaranteeing fair treatment of shareholders; yet it does not
justify the mandatory bid as the only mechanism for acquiring control”.
19 See A Dyck and L Zingales, ‘Private Benefits of Control: an International Comparison’
[2004] Journal of Finance 537, 564.
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activism in the market for corporate control.20 However, the literature is tradi-
tionally divided as to which aim should be pursued with greater resolution. As
seen above, some authors have historically felt that pursuing contendibility for
corporate control allows indirectly to ensure also an adequate level of protec-
tion of minority shareholders.21 Other authors argue the opposite view.22 Re-
cently, policy debates have revealed also an intermediate position, according to
which takeovers should be neither hampered nor promoted, as it is true that
“takeovers may be both value-creating and value-decreasing, but there is no
way to tell ex ante whether they are of the former or the latter kind” and
therefore it is desirable to adopt a so-called “neutral approach”. 23
More realistically, however we believe that the described trade-off not only
suggests to avoid extreme solutions in choosing between the two conflicting
purposes, but also makes their joint pursuing through equidistant approaches
particularly difficult. These latter approaches may obviously be a hope, but we
have to point out how the extent to which the two aims are pursued is the
effect of a decision, mainly political; the regulation of the market for corporate
control can therefore be seen as the result of the political vision of the regulator
about the degree of achievement of the two aims mentioned above; vision that
is not necessarily immutable, but that can indeed vary depending on the fi-
nancial system considered, the socio-economic context and cultural tradition
and the various ideological positions. This position is easily supportable by
observing not only the presence of different takeover regulations from State to
State, but also the alternation, within the same State, of completely different
regulations.
III. Tools of a Takeover Regulation
Once the two traditional policy purposes of a takeover regulation have been
identified, the existence of a certain conflict between those goals has been
recognised and the necessary political nature of the relevant trade-off solution
has been clarified and all the above is borne in mind, it is necessary to consider
20 See SJ Grossman and O Hart, ‘Takeover Bids, the Free-rider Problem, and the Theory
of Corporation’ [1980] Bell Journal of Economics 11, 42.
21 See Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’ op cit, 110.
22 See J Stein,Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia’ [1988] Journal of Political Econ-
omy 16, 61; A Shleifer and R Vishny ‘Management Entrenchment: The Case of Man-
ager-Specific Investment’ [1989] Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 123.
23 See L Enriques, R Gilson and AM Pacces, ‘The Case for an Umbiased Takeover Law
(with anApplication to the EuropeanUnion)’ [2013]Harvard Business LawReview 85,
117; L Enriques ‘European Takeover Law: the Case for a Neutral Approach’ in F
Panunzi (ed), Institutions and Markets (Milan 2010), 26.
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what instruments are present in regulators’ “tool-box” in this rather special
area. In particular, it is necessary to investigate what traditional tools market
regulators have at their disposal when implementing a takeover regulation and
what the impact of these tools is on each purpose, whether positive, neutral or
negative. In fact, the creation of a regulatory system and the possibility of
achieving a certain point of equilibrium in the trade-off solution depends on
how these tools are assembled. However, the ability to provide a critical
assessment of a given regulatory system depends on a knowledge of these
tools. By observing regulatory traditions in this area, it is plausible to argue
that the creation and assessment of a takeover regulation depends on a variety
of tools, here distinguishable into “primary” and “secondary” instruments.
“Primary” instruments are those levers that regulators are forced to take into
account, with the result that – according to certain doctrine24 – even their non-
adoption is in itself a clear choice of legal policy that cannot be considered
neutral. This category includes (A) the presence or absence of procedural rules
for corporate control transactions and (B) the presence or absence of a man-
datory bid rule (MBR).
“Secondary” instruments are those levers that regulators may choose to use
only in presence of an MBR. In the absence of an MBR, the problem of their
desirability does not arise, because such a problem exists only if an MBR is
present. This category includes (1) the nature of conditions of theMBR, (2) the
presence or absence of the rule that requires, when an MBR is pending, the
extension of the chance to sell their shares to all the target company’s share-
holders (the so-called “totalitarian rule”) and (3) the nature of the criteria for
determining the offer price when an MBR is pending.
1. Primary Instruments
It has already been stated that the category of instruments defined as “pri-
mary” includes (A) the presence or absence of procedural rules for the corpo-
rate control transactions and (B) the presence or absence of an MBR.
With regard to the first regulatory lever, it is necessary to make a preliminary
consideration. All evolved legal systems have regulations regarding the circu-
lation of goods in general, in the form of general law on the transfer of own-
ership of things. These regulations are split into a procedural part (provisions
regarding the act and, therefore, the ways in which the contract is concluded)
and a substantial part (provisions regarding the relationship and, therefore, the
effects of the conclusion of the contract). As regards the procedural aspect in
24 See N Irti, L’ordine giuridico del mercato (Bari 1998), 11.
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such legal systems, anyone wishing to acquire goods may address his purchase
proposal to an specific recipient who is the current owner of that good and
wait for acceptance, or otherwise may address his purchase proposal to an
undetermined recipient – i.e. the public – and wait for one or more of the
current owners of that good to adhere to the offer. When the transfer involves
the “goods-corporate control”, the ways in which the contract are concluded
do not differ and, as mentioned above, may be represented by a “private
treaty” (when the acquisition proposal is addressed to an identifiable recipi-
ent) or by a “public offer” (when the acquisition proposal is addressed to an
undetermined recipient, i.e. the target company’s shareholders). However,
what differs is the nature of the goods exchanged, because the “goods-corpo-
rate control” has peculiar and distinctive connotations because of its quanti-
tative and qualitative relevance both at a macro-economic and at a micro-
economic level. In fact, the relationship between the “transfer of goods in
general” and the “transfer of corporate control in particular” can be consid-
ered as a relationship between genus and species, simply because of the special
features of the goods transferred. This special circumstance would then be able
to justify the presence of a “special law of transfer of ownership of corporate
control”, which could in turn legitimately split depending whether the way in
which the contract is concluded is by an acquisition proposal to an identifiable
recipient (“private treaty”) or to an undetermined recipient (“public offer to
the target company’s shareholders”).25 At EU level, special procedural rules
for the private treaty do not exist yet, but there are some special procedural
rules for the public offer which are represented for example by the presence of
certain obligations of disclosure and communication (Articles 6 and 8 of the
Directive), by the passivity rule (Article 9) and by the neutralization of multi-
ple voting shares (Article 11). This regulatory tool hence expresses the degree
25 Once what is justifiable has been clarified, we must still discuss what is hypothetically
possible. With respect to the provisions of law for transfer of ownership of things,
legislators may in fact address the issue of procedural rules for the transfer of corporate
control in four ways: (i) they may decide not to envisage any special rights for the
transfer of corporate control whether by private agreement or by takeover bid, thus
applying the applicable rules of law to both, i.e. that regarding ordinary proposal and
acceptance for the former and public offers to the latter; (ii) they may decide to set up a
special law for transfer of corporate control for both private agreements and takeover
bids, thus applying the specific provisions put in place for each while law will regulate
only the remaining issues; (iii) they may decide to set up a special right of transfer of
corporate control for private agreements, but not for public takeover bids, thus applying
the specific provisions envisaged to the former, while the public takeover bids will be
subject to the provisions of law relating to public offers; (iv) they may decide to set up a
special law of transfer of corporate control for public takeover bids, but not for private
agreements, thus applying the specific provisions envisaged to the former, while private
agreements will be subject to the provisions of law relating to proposal and acceptance.
See N Irti, L’età della decodificazione (Milano 1989), 23.
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of rigour that regulators choose for the procedural regulation for the corporate
control transactions. Having said that, it is now possible to consider what the
impact of the possible presence of control transactions’ special procedural
rules is on the above-mentioned policy purposes. Before proceeding, it should
be pointed out that the degree of rigour that regulators can confer on a take-
over regulation by using special procedural rules is influenced by two distinct
factors. Firstly, the level of restrictiveness of rules that may be established to
regulate private treaties and public offers is very important. Less restrictive
rules (e.g. because rules do not exist or because rules exist but are not strict
with regard to self-defence techniques) will have a positive impact on the
contendibility of corporate control and a negative impact on the protection
of minority shareholders. Conversely, more restrictive rules (e.g. because rules
are strict with regard to self-defence techniques or communication obliga-
tions) will adversely affect the contendibility of corporate control while hav-
ing a positive effect on the protection of minority shareholders. Secondly, the
scope of the rules possibly established to regulate private treaties and public
offers is also very important. The greater breadth of less restrictive rules, or the
lesser breadth of stricter rules, will have a positive impact on the contendibility
of corporate control and a negative impact on the protection of minority
shareholders and, conversely, the smaller amplitude of less restrictive rules
or the greater amplitude of stricter rules will adversely affect the contendibility
of corporate control while having a positive effect on the protection of minor-
ity shareholders.26
Once the extent of the impact of the first lever on the policy purposes has been
clarified, the assessment of the impact of the second regulatory instrument (the
presence or absence of an MBR) on the same goals becomes more intuitive.
The presence of an MBR clearly increases the level of transparency, as it
requires the acquisition proposal to be made publicly. However, the corporate
control transaction is more burdensome. The presence of anMBRwill have an
adverse effect on the contendibility of corporate control and a positive effect
on the protection of minority shareholders. By contrast, the absence of an
MBR decreases both the level of transparency and the burden of the trans-
action, thus positively affecting the contendibility and negatively affecting the
protection of minority shareholders. The Takeover Bids Directive makes a
clear choice and opts for the introduction of the MBR at European level, by
providing in Article 5 that, “where a natural or legal person holds securities of
a company which give him/her a specified percentage of voting rights in that
company, Member States shall ensure that such a person is required to make a
bid”.
26 See FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer’ [1981] Harvard Law Review 1161, 1168.
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2. Secondary Instruments
It has been said that the category of instruments defined as “secondary” (i.e.
only usable in presence of anMBR) includes (1) the nature of conditions of the
MBR, (2) the presence or absence of the rule that requires, when an MBR is
pending, the extension of the chance to sell their shares to all target company’s
shareholders and (3) the nature of the criteria for determining the offer price
when an MBR is pending.
Doctrine and jurisprudence have long debated the nature of conditions of the
MBR. Traditionally, the conditions of theMBR are alternately represented, on
the one hand, by the intention to acquire or the acquisition of corporate
control or, on the other hand, by the passing of a fixed threshold of the target
company’s share capital. If the first condition is preferred, then any form of
transfer of control will lead to an obligation to launch a takeover bid and this
will have a positive impact on the protection of minority shareholders, but
adversely affect the contendibility. If the second condition is preferred (as the
Directive has opted for, when Article 5 refers to “a specified percentage of
voting rights”), then there are a number of considerations to take into account.
Firstly, forcing those who pass a share capital’s fixed threshold (and not those
who acquire an unclearly identified “corporate control”) to launch a takeover
bid brings a greater certainty in the law and in the market, because it takes into
account an objective, and objectively detectable, condition. In doing so, the
protection of minority shareholders and transparency will be better pursued.27
Secondly, a pre-established fixed threshold should make it possible to pursue
even greater contendibility. Given that the obligation to launch a takeover bid
would not operate below the threshold, it would enable great freedom of
movement for those who intend to take over the company within the limits
of the threshold; therefore, below the threshold, a personwould be able to buy
and sell the company’s shares freely and without any obligation to launch a
takeover bid.28 While remaining below the threshold then, transfers for cor-
porate control may also occur without any obligation to launch a takeover bid.
Thirdly, the introduction of a fixed threshold may have a positive effect on
contendibility, but its actual operation might also have an adverse effect. In
fact, an obligation to launch a takeover bid might also arise when a person
passes the threshold without purchasing the corporate control. Should this be
the case, the choice to use the passing of a fixed threshold should be accom-
panied by the choice of which fixed threshold may be used. A very high
27 See Davies, ‘The Notion of Equality in European Takeovers Regulation’, op cit, 14;
Andrews, ‘The Stockholder’s Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares’, op cit,
515. As noted by Costi, Il mercato mobiliare, op cit, 86, the probable assumption is that
the theshold fixed coincides with the controlling interest.
28 See JC Coffee, ‘Regulating the Market for Corporate Control’, op cit, 1289.
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threshold would facilitate transfers of control of a company and its contend-
ibility, but probably would weaken the protection of minority shareholders,
because if the transfer of control occurred frequently without the obligation to
launch a takeover bid, then a regulation inspired to equal treatment and trans-
parency “would be triggered” only rarely.29 Conversely, a very low threshold
would ensure a stronger protection of minority shareholders, but would rigid-
ify the market for corporate control and reduce contendibility, thus obtaining
the opposite effect to that which the choice of a fixed threshold aimed to
produce.30 On this point, the Directive does not make a clear choice, as Para-
graph 3 of Article 5 states that “the percentage of voting rights which confers
control and the method of its calculation shall be determined by the rules of
the Member States in which the company has its registered office”, opening –
however – a path to piecemeal solutions.
With regard to the presence or absence of the rule that requires, when anMBR
is pending, the extension of the chance to sell their shares to all target com-
pany’s shareholders, the presence of the totalitarian rule increases the chance
for minority shareholders to exit, as well as the burdensomeness of the trans-
action and will adversely affect contendibility and positively affect the pro-
tection of minority shareholders. Conversely, the absence of the totalitarian
rule decreases the opportunity for minority shareholders to exit as well as the
burdensomeness of the transaction and, therefore, will have a positive impact
on the contendibility and a negative impact on the protection of minority
shareholders. The Directive opts for the first solution and – still in Article 5
– provides that the bid “shall be addressed to all the securities’ holders for all
their holdings”.
With regard to the nature of the criteria for determining the offer price when
an MBR is pending, the presence of mechanisms that allow minority share-
holders to obtain the same price paid by the new controlling shareholder to
acquire control, increases the chance of minority shareholders to participate in
the distribution of the bonus for control as well as the burdensomeness of the
transaction and, therefore, negatively affect the contendibility and positively
affect the protection ofminority shareholders. Conversely, the absence of such
mechanisms decreases the opportunity of minority shareholders to participate
in the distribution of the bonus for control as well as the burdensomeness of
the transaction and, therefore, will have a positive impact on contendibility
and a negative impact on the protection of minority shareholders. The Direc-
tive makes a balanced choice by introducing the notion of “equitable price” as
“the highest price paid for the securities by the offeror over a period, to be
29 See Davies and Hopt, ‘Control Transactions’, op cit, 161.
30 See F Belli, ‘Alla soglia del 30% scatta l’Opa obbligatoria’ [1998] Guida al diritto de Il
Sole-24 Ore 141, 143.
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determined by Member States, of not less than six months and not more than
twelve before the bid”.
IV. Conclusion
The combination of all the regulatory tools described above directly expresses
the combination of the policy purposes pursued by the regulators in building a
regulatory system and – in its assessment – represents a means of understand-
ing and interpretation of the related results. Therefore, the political nature that
is intrinsic to the regulatory choices makes it difficult to attempt to formulate
an absolute judgment on a given regulation; if this is true, then a regulation
assessment must necessarily be made in a comparative way. In this regard, the
diversity of the structures of the financial systems, the transformation of the
socio-economic contexts, and the fragmentation and change both of cultural
traditions and of the political positions show not only the presence of different
takeover regulations from State to State, but also a succession of different
regulatory systems within the same State.
During the early 90s, regulators of several EU Countries (e.g. Italy, France)
developed a strong sensitivity to the issue of the protection of minority share-
holders and opted formodels with theMBR characterized also by the presence
of special procedural rules for all the takeover bids (communication duties and
passivity rule) which would therefore tend to sacrifice contendibility.31 How-
ever, due to the particular combination of the various levers, in most cases, the
models adopted by the individual Member States seemed to reach a more
refined balance point. Compared to the pre-90s regimes, for example, the
degree of protection of minority shareholders improved also because of the
presence of a MBR, often configured as totalitarian and often aimed at pro-
moting a still reasonable price (for example, the so-called weighted average
price of the shares in the last 12 months). However, even the efficiency profiles
are improved. Despite the presence of a mandatory-and-totalitarian bid rule,
there is also a positive impact on contendibility, thanks to both the presence of
a fixed threshold (often 30%), and the prediction of the preventive-and-vol-
untary takeover bid as hypothesis of exemption from the MBR, as well as the
particular criteria for determining the offer price. This is the background for
the debate on the European takeover bids that led to the adoption of the
Takeover Bids Directive.32 What is important is the fact that the Directive tries
to introduce a common playing field at the EU level. However, the need for
31 See R La Porta and others, ‘Corporate Ownership around the World’ [1999] Journal of
Finance 471, 480.
32 See B Clarke, ‘European Union Articles 9 and 11 of the Takeover Directive (2004/25)
and the Market for Corporate Control’ [2006] Journal of Business Law 355, 361.
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harmonization is substantially frustrated by the fact that, with reference to
some regulatory tools (passivity rule, multiple voting shares and – as seen
above – conditions of the MBR), the Directive introduces the so-called “op-
tional arrangements” (Article 12), which allow individual Member States to
provide for derogations that, ultimately, are unable to make the European
market truly “common” as regards corporate control. This circumstance –
combined with the approach of the financial crisis – generated a greater risk
for the more highly regulated and weaker companies (for example, the Italian
ones) of being targets of hostile takeovers by the less regulated and stronger
companies (for example, the German ones) and therefore allows a better
understanding of subsequent developments of the various legal systems in
the field. In fact, the implementing regulations (for example, the Italian ones)
have introduced several changes to previous regulatory tools: new exceptions
to the passivity rule; the so-called reciprocity rule, that is the ex lege disappli-
cation of the passivity rule when the takeover bid is launched by a company
which is not subject to a similar obligation; the amendment in a stricter sense
of the criteria for determining the price, which becomes equal to the highest
price of the shares registered in the last 12 months. All this shows how the
national regulators have gradually moved towards greater protection of mi-
nority shareholders and lesser contendibility for corporate control, with the
result of curbing efficiency profiles and the mobility of corporate ownership.
And all this, not only for greater sensitivity towards profiles of fairness, but
also – I would say – as a form of self-defence against a backlash of protection-
ism coming from other Member States, fuelled by the combination of the lack
of harmonization and the recent financial crisis. 33
That said – and regardless of this – what is relevant is that the proposed
analysis model seems to allow, on the one hand and given specific policy
purposes, to indicate the possible regulatory tools to pursue those purposes
and, on the other side and given a determined takeovers regulation, to make a
detailed ex-ante assessment in targeting efficiency profiles or fairness profiles.
Ultimately, the proposedmodel would serve to more clearly interpret a period
of the past and to imagine possible future developments.
33 See Enriques, Gilson and Pacces, ‘The Case for an Umbiased Takeover Law’ op cit, 117.
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